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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the order of the Court of Appeal's Denying 
petitioners' request for judicial review discretionary or did it 
constitute a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction? 
2. Are Petitioners required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of five 
non-final orders of the administrative law judge? 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioners bring this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-4 (1992), from an order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
entered on May 29, 1992. Respondent, the Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing ("Division") submits this 
brief in opposition to Petitioners' petition for writ of 
certiorari pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Utah Court Rules Ann. § (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Interpretation of the following statutes rules are 
determinative for this appeal: Utah Const, art I § 11, Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-1-12 (Supp. 1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) 
(1989), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (Supp. 1989), Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-18 (1989), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992), Utah Rules of 
App. Proc. 5, 14, 17, and 19, Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. 65b. 
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Verbatim citation of all statutes and rules listed above are 
contained in Appendix D. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners are licensees of the Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing ("Division"). Petitioners are licensed to 
practice Dentistry and to prescribe and administer controlled 
substances* Petitioners are brothers who practice Dentistry in 
two offices located in Spanish Fork and Midvale, Utah. 
In August 1989, a petition was filed by the Division 
alleging that Petitioners engaged in unprofessional conduct 
including incompetence in the practice of dentistry, fraudulent 
billing and record keeping practices, over-prescribing controlled 
substances, engaging in inappropriate physical contact with 
patients and employees including sexual acts with a patient in 
exchange for drugs, and taking lewd nude photographs of a patient 
while she was under the influence of nitrous oxide. 
On June 14, 1991, counsel for the Division filed a Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence. Petitioners filed their 
response on June 26, 1992. Oral argument was heard on the 
Division's motion in limine on April 1, 1992. On April 17, 1992, 
Administrative Law Judge, Stephen Eklund, issued an order 
permitting Petitioner's to present evidence of K.W.'s or any 
other witness' prior sexual behavior "with a licensed health care 
2 
professional within the context of a physician/patient 
relationship, both on cross-examination of that witness and for 
possible impeachment purposes of rebuttal." (Order on Division's 
Motion in Limine, April 17, 1992 p. 9) Only evidence of K.W.'s 
or another witness' "general prior sexual history or reputation 
shall be excluded." Id. 
On June 21, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close the 
hearing to the public and a memorandum regarding the appropriate 
standard of proof for disciplinary hearings. The Division filed 
a response to Petitioner's motion on July 1, 1991. With respect 
to the motion to close the hearing, the Salt Lake Tribune filed a 
petition to intervene on July 1, 1991. Administrative law judge 
Stephen Eklund granted the Tribune's petition on July 2, 1991. 
On April 1, 1992 oral argument on Petitioners' motion to 
close was heard before the administrative law judge and the 
Dentist and Dental Hygienist Licensing Board. Pursuant to 
section 52-4-1 et seq. the Board voted four to two to keep the 
hearing open. On April 7, 1992 the administrative law judge 
issued an order on behalf of the Board providing that the hearing 
would remain open to the public pursuant to the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act. 
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On April 1, 1992, argument on the standard of proof was 
heard by the ALJ. The ALJ issued an order on April 17, 1992 
stating that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings 
is preponderance of the evidence. 
All of the above orders of the ALJ are non-final orders, and 
a hearing on the merits in this case is scheduled to be heard on 
September 28 - October 3, 1992. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DENY PETITIONER'S PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
A petition for Writ of Certiorari according to Rule 46 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is "granted only for 
special and important reasons." Utah Rules of App. § (1992). The 
following considerations, while neither controlling nor the only 
measure of the Supreme Court's discretion to grant or deny 
petitions for writ of certiorari, are listed under Rule 46 as 
follows: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision in conflict with a decision of another panel 
of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
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for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has 
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
Utah Rules of App. Proc. § 46 (1992). None of the considerations 
provided under Rule 46 are found in Petitioners' petition for 
writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeal's denial of Petitioners' 
interlocutory appeal was merely an exercise of their broad 
discretion to grant or deny requests for judicial review. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DISCRETION TO GRANT OR 
DENY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS. 
Petitioners sought interlocutory review before the Court 
of Appeals of five non-final orders issued by the administrative 
law judge ("ALJ") in the administrative proceeding below. 
Without stating its reasons for doing so, the Utah Court of 
Appeals denied Petitioners' request for interlocutory review and 
extraordinary relief. 
This petition for writ of certiorari is premised on the 
false assumption that the Court of Appeals determined that it was 
without jurisdiction to consider Petitioners' appeal. (Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, p. 6-13.) It is clear on the face of the 
order that the Court of Appeals made no such determination. 
Their order, in its entirety states: 
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This matter is before the court upon a petition 
for review of a non-final administrative order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. 
In light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that 
respondent's motion to accept a late filed response is 
denied. 
The Court of Appeal's order cannot, nor should it be 
construed, as a determination by the court that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review Petitioners' interlocutory appeal. 
Although it is the Division's assertion that the Court of Appeals 
lacks jurisdiction to review non-final administrative orders, the 
Court of Appeals did not decide that issue. The only assumption 
that can be made, based on the written order of the Court of 
Appeals, is that the court, in its sound discretion, denied 
Petitioners' request for judicial review and extraordinary 
relief. 
To show that the Court of Appeals erred in denying their 
interlocutory appeal, Petitioners set forth a somewhat detailed 
although flawed analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1992 & 
Supp.). Specifically, Petitioners contend that the terms "final 
orders" and "decrees" found in that statute are distinct and that 
the term "decrees" signifies non-final orders rather final 
decrees. (Petition for writ of certiorari p.7-10) Petitioners 
also invoke well established canons of statutory interpretation 
to support their construction of section 78-2a-3(2). Petitioners 
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argue that the Court of Appeals somehow misinterpreted or ignored 
section 78-2a-3(2) and therefore erred in denying their petition 
for interlocutory review and extraordinary relief. 
Petitioners' arguments lack merit for the following reasons: 
First, as expressed above, the Court of Appeals did not hold that 
it lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioners' appeal- There is 
no support for Petitioners' claim that Court of Appeals 
misinterpreted section 78-2a-3(2). Second, Petitioners never 
raised section 78-2a-3(2) as a grounds for appellate 
jurisdiction. Section 78-2a-3(2) was overlooked entirely. 
Because Petitioners neglected to raise section 78-2a-3(2) as a 
grounds for appellate jurisdiction on their appeal, Petitioners' 
argument that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted section 7 8-2a-
3(2) is unjustified. It is also improperly raised as a basis for 
appeal in their petition for writ of certiorari. It is 
nonsensical to challenge the decision of the Court of Appeals 
over an issue that was not even raised. Also, Petitioners' claim 
has not been properly preserved on appeal to this court. 
In their petition for judicial review with the Court of 
Appeals, Petitioners' raised two "alternative theories of 
jurisdiction", (1) An interlocutory appeal under Rule 14 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and (2) an extraordinary writ 
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under civil procedure rule 65B and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 8-9) 
By their own admission, Petitioners' first alternative was 
to file their appeal as a request for review under Rule 14. 
Petitioners did not file a motion as required under rule 65B or 
rule 19. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 15) Instead of 
complying with the filing rules, Petitioners asked the court to 
choose which alternative theory of jurisdiction was proper, then, 
if the court concluded that they were without jurisdiction 
pursuant to Rule 14, requested that the court grant Petitioners 
leave to properly file a motion in accordance with rule 65B and 
appellate Rule 19. (Petition to the Court of Appeals p. 14-15) 
Because rule 14, as Petitioners admitted, does not provide 
for interlocutory appeals from administrative agencies, and 
Petitioners failed to comply with the filing rules under rule 65b 
and rule 19, the Court of Appeals had sufficient grounds to deny 
Petitioners' interlocutory appeal and request for extraordinary 
relief. The Court of Appeals, in their discretion may also have 
declined to exercise its jurisdiction without deciding whether it 
had jurisdiction to review the appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure § 5 (1992)(Discretionary Appeals from Interlocutory 
Orders). 
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None of the considerations listed under Rule 46 in aid of 
this court's authority to grant or deny writs of certiorari are 
present in this case. Unless the Court of Appeals is held by 
this court to have abused its discretion in denying Petitioners' 
interlocutory appealf Petitioners' petition for writ of 
certiorari should be denied. 
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
NON-FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS. 
Although its the Division's contention that the Court of 
Appeal's order denying Petitioners' request for interlocutory was 
merely discretionary, the Division also asserts in the 
alternative that the Court of Appeals would, in any event, have 
been required to dismiss Petitioners' petition for lack of 
jurisdiction. "It is a court's first duty to determine if it has 
jurisdiction." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1989). "If the court concludes that it does not have 
jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
action." Id. 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is conferred by 
statute. Despite Petitioners' arguments to the contrary, the 
court's denial of Petitioners' request for interlocutory review 
did not deprive them of a constitutional right under Utah Const, 
art. I, sec. 11. There is no constitutional right to judicial 
review. See, DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 
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627 (Utah App. 1988), The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
is embodied in section 78-2a-3(2)(a) which vests the Court of 
Appeals with "[a]ppellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings . . . 
. . .(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings." . . . 
Utah Code Ann, § (1992) (emphasis added). This section also 
refers to all other types of cases that confer original appellate 
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals. 
In the context of appeals from the final orders of an 
administrative agency, the Utah Court of Appeals made this 
comment with respect to section 78-2a-3(2)(a): "This general 
statute defines the outermost limits of our appellate 
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." DeBry 
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). "It is not a catchall provision authorizing us to 
review the orders of every administrative agency ... but allows 
review only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review." Id. 
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According to section 78-2a-3(4), compliance with the 
administrative procedures act is required by the Court of 
Appeals, Utah Code Ann. § (1992). Section 63-46b-16(l) of the 
Administrative Procedures Act grants the Court of Appeals 
"jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § (1989). 
Finality, has long been acknowledged as a prerequisite for 
judicial review. While this principle has a well established 
history in administrative jurisprudence it is also a prerequisite 
to review of decisions from the regular court system. 
The ALJ's orders that Petitioners seek to appeal are not 
final orders, nor do the interlocutory orders of the ALJ 
constitute final agency action as required by administrative 
procedures act and section 78-2a-3(2)(a). A final order will be 
issued by the Division only after formal adjudicative proceedings 
in this matter have been concluded and all issues pending before 
the Division have been determined. 
In Sloan v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission,7 81 
P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a 
remand order to an administrative law judge was not a final order 
and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In Sloan, the 
Utah Industrial Commission adopted the findings of an 
administrative law judge but remanded to the administrative law 
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judge the issue of whether the claimant was entitled to medical 
expenses. The Sloan court held that the remand order was not a 
final appealable order. "We agree that an order of the agency is 
not final so long as it reserves something to the agency for 
further decision." j[d. at 464. 
Attempts to seek interlocutory review of non-final orders of 
the ALJ in licensing proceedings are not new to the Division nor 
to the Court of Appeals. For example, in Barney v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. 
App.), Cert denied, (Utah Sup. Ct. June 19, 1992) this court 
recently denied certiorari to review an order of the Utah Court 
of Appeals dismissing an interlocutory appeal from a non-final 
order issued by the ALJ in a professional disciplinary 
proceeding. Barney involved a licensed health facility 
administrator whose license is still the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings initiated by the Division. The licensee in Barney, 
sought interlocutory review with the Utah Court of Appeals of a 
non-final order issue by the ALJ. The order of the ALJ denied 
Barney's motion to dismiss the Division's petition based on 
double jeopardy grounds. Referring to Sloan, the Court of 
Appeals held it did not have jurisdiction to review the order of 
the administrative law judge because the order lacked "finality". 
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The court distinguished the requirement of finality with that of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies stating: 
[T]he issue before the agency and the issue before this 
court [in Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce1 was whether 
all levels of agency review were complete at the time 
judicial review was sought. In contrast, ... the 
requirement of finality contemplates that the agency 
proceedings have been brought to their conclusion by 
disposition of all issues before the agency. The 
denial of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to 
continue in the agency and is not a final order for 
purposes of judicial review. 
Barney, 828 P.2d 544 (emphasis added). 
In addition to Sloan, Debry and Barney, this court has 
recognized the prerequisite of final agency action before a party 
may obtain judicial review. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1990) (The court dismissed the first 
petition for review of an ALJ's refusal to grant permanent total 
disability benefits because there was no final appealable 
order.); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 718 (Utah 1978) ("The 
proper procedure to challenge the statute and the administration 
thereof is by judicial review after final administrative action 
has been taken."). 
Petitioners claim that section 63-46b-14(2) confers 
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to review non-final orders 
under certain circumstances. Section 63-46b-14(2)(b) provides 
that "the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of 
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
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(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) 
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion." Utah Code Ann, § (1989). 
Sections 63-46b-14(2)(b) and 63-46b-16(l) both embody the 
related requirements of finality and exhaustion of administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial review. However the exception to 
the exhaustion requirement does not apply to Petitioner's 
interlocutory appeal of the ALJ's orders. 
IV. SECTION 63-46b-14(2)(b) SHOULD NOT DISPEL OF THE 
REQUIREMENT OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN. 
Although section 63-46b-14(2)(b) provides an exception to 
the requirement that a party exhaust all administrative remedies 
before seeking judicial review, it does not provide for automatic 
appellate rights every time a party claims that a non-final 
decision of an administrative court is in error. The principle 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and finality are well 
established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. Although 
well established, the principles are often confused. 
Once agency action commences and adjudicative proceedings 
are under way, review of the agency's decisions can only be had 
after a final order or final action is taken. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1)(1989). Even 
where some, but not all of issues that are raised, may be outside 
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of the competence or jurisdiction of the agency to decide, courts 
in this state adhere to the requirement that the agency reach a 
final determination on all matters properly before it before 
permitting judicial review, Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) ("Administrative agencies 
do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic 
legislation [citations omitted] But the mere introduction of a 
constitutional claim does not obviate the need for exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.")l 
On the other hand, exhaustion of administrative remedies 
allows parties under unusual circumstances to by-pass the 
administrative forum all together and seek judicial review or 
judicial determination of their claim. Only in rare 
circumstances can parties by-pass the administrative forum and 
proceed directly to the courts for relief. In S&G, Inc. v. 
Morgan, 797 P. 2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990), this court explained, 
The requirement of participation as a perquisite 
to standing to appeal is a corollary of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well 
settled under this doctrine that persons aggrieved by 
decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to 
determine . . . matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies, [citations omitted] 
In addition, the court in Johnson noted the well 
established principle that " [e]xhaustion of administrative remedies 
may not be necessary when it would serve no useful purpose." Id. 
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The exhaustion requirement should not be excused for 
interlocutory review of an ALJ's orders concerning matters of 
procedure, the admissibility of evidence, etc. An interlocutory 
order of an administrative law judge that does not affect the 
rights of the parties or which determines questions of law or 
fact pertaining to the merits of the case are not contemplated in 
the statute excusing the exhaustion requirement. The Division 
has not taken any action with respect to Petitioner's licensees. 
Moreover, Petitioners' appeal does not concern any question 
outside the competence of the ALJ to determine. The Division 
should be afforded the opportunity to bring proceedings on this 
matter to a conclusion after determining all issues that are 
within its jurisdiction to decide. 
V. PETITIONERS' CLAIM OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND 
INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
To excuse their failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
or await a final order, Petitioners claim that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if the proceedings before the Division are 
allowed to continue on its present course. Petitioners 
specifically refer to the publicity this case, which is now 
nearly three years old, has received in the media and press. 
Although a complete review of the media and publicity that has 
attended this case is not warranted and is irrelevant, it is 
worthy to note that Petitioners have also made numerous oral and 
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written statements to the press, including statements to the 
national and local media. 
Regardless of the attention imparted to these proceedings by 
the press, it has been made evident that the Dental Board, who 
will serve as the fact finder in this matter, has not been 
tainted by any pre-hearing publicity. Petitioners' conducted 
voir dire of the Dental Board on April 1, 1992. During voir 
dire, it became absolutely clear that the Dental Board has been 
largely unaware and completely unaffected by any media attention 
directed at this case (a favorable result that becomes more 
difficult to sustain as this hearing is delayed by court actions 
filed by Petitioners). Petitioners passed on all members of the 
Board for cause, excluding the Board's public member who served 
as a past director of the Department of Commerce. The public 
member was subsequently recused from participating in these 
proceedings because of his prior relationship with the Division. 
Petitioners claim that no adequate remedy exists other than 
an interlocutory appeal or extraordinary relief to prevent 
irreparable harm to their reputations. Regardless of whether 
interlocutory relief is granted, the courts cannot prevent bad 
publicity. This argument also belies the fact that Petitioners 
claim that there has already been extensive publicity in this 
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case. None of Petitioner's arguments go to the issue of the 
adequacy or inadequacy of petitioners' administrative remedies. 
Petitioners are afforded administrative remedies that 
adequately protect their rights and insure that their licenses 
and livelihood will not be harmed without due process of law. 
For example, following formal adjudicative proceedings, 
Petitioners may seek agency review of the final order with the 
Department of Commerce. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-12. (Supp.1992) 
Also, in the event Petitioners' licenses are suspended, revoked 
or placed on probation, Petitioners may move to have the ordered 
stayed by the agency pending appeal of the agency's decision. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-18 (1989). In addition to the 
above, Petitioners can also request a stay from the Court of 
Appeals pending appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure § 17 
(1992). These remedies are more than adequate to protect 
Petitioners from the unwarranted invasion of their due process 
rights. 
VI. THE POTENTIAL HARM TO PETITIONERS BY REQUIRING 
EXHAUSTION IS OUTWEIGHED BY THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
PROCEEDING TO HEARING 
Petitioners clearly have a protected property interest in 
their licenses as Dentists. However, courts have long recognized 
that although licensee's interest in their livelihood and 
profession is substantial, the government's interest in 
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protecting the public health and safety is paramount. 
"[G]overnment has a paramount obligation to the protect the 
general health of the public. The right of physicians (or 
dentists) to practice their professions is necessarily 
subordinate to this governmental interest." In Re License 
Revocation of Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (N.J. 1982); See also Steadman 
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (U.S. Supreme Court implicitly 
concluded that there was no fundamental liberty interest at stake 
in a proceeding to revoke license to pursue a profession); State 
v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah 1976) (Practice of healing 
professions is not a right, but a privilege). 
Despite Petitioners' assertion that it would be more 
efficient to resolve legal disputes on appeal to this court 
before the hearing, this would be the least efficient manner to 
resolve the legal issues raised by Petitioners. Requiring 
Petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies serves to 
prevent the impairment of administrative processes by avoidable 
interruption and delay, and the conservation of judicial 
resources by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review. 
Moreover, in the event Petitioners are absolved of any 
professional violation, review by this court would be moot. 
Rather than review administrative orders in piecemeal fashion, it 
would be more efficient to review those orders with a complete 
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record in conjunction with all other potential grounds for 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals denial of Petitioners' interlocutory 
appeal is a matter within the court's judicial discretion. 
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not present any 
issue of fact or law that warrants review by this court. None of 
the considerations listed under Rule 46 in aid of this court's 
discretion to accept or reject writs of certiorari are present. 
Submitted this j//7^day of July, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
! , ( ' * ' / f^ / '." •> certify that on \'* 
I served a copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to Jackson Howard, counsel for Petitioners 
in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Kent Blaine Hansen and 
Brent D. Hansen, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing, 
Respondent. 
MAY291992 
•^jhrv r Noonan 
c\vr* cf (he Court 
v&\\ Court of Appeals 
ORDER 
Case No. 920291-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings (Law & Motion). 
This matter is before the court upon a petition for review 
of a non-final administrative order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. In 
light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that respondent's 
motion to accept a late filed response is denied. 
Dated this ^yV^day of May, 1992. 
Gregory Jk? Q\ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
JUN 02 1992 
HOWARD, LEWES I * r a S 3 i 
udith M. Billings, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of May, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Jackson Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Linda J. Barclay 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
Robert E. Steed 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
36 South State Street, 1100 Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 29th day of May, 1992. 
By < VV.V ^d;?<'/l/ufch-
Deputy C2Terk 
APPENDIX B 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D, HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO 
CLOSE HEARING 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the 
hearing in the above-entitled matter to all members of the press 
and public. On July 1, 19S1, the Division filed a memorandum 
opposing that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a petition 
tc intervene with respect to the mciicr.. By Order, dated July 2, 
1991, the Court granted that petition and the Intervener's 
memorandum in opposition to Respondents7 motion was filed on July 
3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the submissions by the 
Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 and July 10, 1991, 
respectively. 
Oral argument on the motion was conducted on April 1, 1992 
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists 
Board. Aside from the merits of the motion, the narrow issue 
initially presented was the manner in which the motion should be 
addressed. Specifically, the issue is whether the motion is one 
properly before the administrative law judge or the Board. At 
the conclusion of argument in that regard, the Court entered an 
order, the terms of which are restated as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Respondents assert parties to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding have a statutory right to be present at any hearing, 
but urge the press and the public have no such right. 
Respondents thus contend the presiding officer may take 
appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing and 
may thus exclude the press and public in an appropriate case. 
Respondents further assert the presiding officer in this 
proceeding is the administrative law judge. Since the Open and 
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et seq., 
hereinafter, the Act) only applies to meetings convened by a 
public body which consists of two or more persons, Respondents 
urge it is the administrative law judge - as the presiding 
officer - who is authorized to determine wherher the subsequent 
hearing in this proceeding should be closed. 
The Division and the Intervenor jointly contend the Act 
applies to the hearing to be conducted in this proceeding, any 
decision to close the hearing is thus governed by the Act and 
that determination is to be made by the public body before whom 
the hearing will be held. 
The Act generally governs meetings convened by a public 
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body, as those terms are defined in Sections 52-4-2(1) and (2), 
respectively. Sections 52-4-2(1) defines "meeting" as: 
. . . the convening of a public body, with 
a quorum present, whether in person or by 
means of electronic equipment, for the 
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter 
over which the public body has jurisdiction 
or advisory power. . .. 
Section 52-4-2(2) defines "public body" as: 
. . . any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or 
its political subdivisions which consists of 
two or more persons that expends, disburses, 
or is supported in whole or in part by tax 
revenue and is vested with the authority to 
make decisions regarding the public's 
business . . . . 
On April 11, 1977, an opinion was issued (#77-94) by James 
L. Barker of the Office of the Utah Attorney General to Ronald E. 
Casper, then Director of the Department of Registration, now 
known as the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
The just-stated opinion was in response to various questions 
concerning the scope of the Act with regard to meetings conducted 
by boards and committees established pursuant to Section 53-1-1 
et seq. The opinion set forth the conclusion that such boards 
and committees are "public bodies" with the meaninc of Section 
52-4r2 and that quasi-judicial hearings "to determine findings 
and recommendations for disciplinary action" are subject to the 
Act. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-l et 
seq., hereinafter, the UAPA) does not expressly provide that 
hearings conducted in formal adjudicative proceedings are subject 
to the requirements of Section 52-4-1 et seq. Section 63-46b-8 
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generally sets forth hearing procedures applicable in formal 
adjudicative proceedings• Subsection (1)(i) of that statute 
merely provides all hearings "shall be open to all parties". 
However, Comments of the Utah Administrative Lav Advisory 
Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of the UAPA (Code 
Co, at 14) provide as follows: 
Non-parties may also be afforded the 
opportunity to observe hearings. See e.g., 
Section 52-4-1 et seq. (Open and Public 
Meetings Act). 
Given the foregoing, the Court concludes the Act applies to 
hearings conducted in professional disciplinary licensure 
proceedings initiated by the Division if the presiding officer at 
the hearing is a "public body" within the meaning of Section 52-
4-2(2). The Court also notes Section 13-1-11, which authorizes 
the Department to employ administrative law judges "to conduct 
hearings for the department". If an administrative law judge is 
the presiding officer duly authorized to conduct a hearing and 
subsequently enter an order pursuant to Section 13-1-12(1)(a), 
the Act would not apply because an administrative law judge is 
not a "public body" within the meaning of the Act. 
, Section 63-46b-8(2) of the UAPA expressly provides that 
nothing in that section precludes the administrative law judge -
as the presiding officer - "from taking appropriate measures 
necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing". Further, 
R151-46b-10(B) of the rules of procedure which govern 
departmental adjudicative proceedings provides: 
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Unless ordered by the department for good 
cause, if a hearing is conducted, it shall be 
open to the public• 
Pursuant to the just-quoted rule, an administrative law judge -
as the presiding officer authorized to conduct a hearing - could 
determine to close the hearing for good cause (e.g., an in camera 
proceeding could be conducted, as was done at the conclusion of 
Respondents' April 1, 1992 voir dire examination of the Board). 
Such a determination would not be governed by the Act. 
However, it is the Board which is duly authorized to act as 
the presiding officer in the subsequent hearing in this 
proceeding with respect to the entry of findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and any recommended order regarding 
Respondents' licenses. Thus, the hearing to be held is governed 
by the Act and the decision whether to close the hearing is a 
matter properly addressed to the Board. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to close 
the hearing to be conducted before the Board is a matter governed 
by the Act. The Board - as the presiding officer authorized to 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended 
order subsequent to any such hearing - shall address Respondents' 
motion and determine whether the hearing should be closed, 
consistent with the provisions of the Act. 
Dated this 'v2*~ day of April, 1992 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTHENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION TO CLOSE HEARING 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune 
BY THE BOARD: 
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the 
hearing in this proceeding to all members of the press and 
public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum in 
opposition to that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a 
petition to intervene with respect to the motion. By Order, 
dated July 2, 1991, the Court granted that petition and the 
Intervener's memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was 
filed on July 3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the 
submissions by the Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 
and July 10, 1991, respectively* 
Oral argument on Respondents' motion was conducted on April 
1, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists 
Board. Members of the Board present were Mark L. Christensen, 
Paul R. Lunt, Elizabeth A. Reinerth, Max A. Blackham, Floyd R. 
Tanner, and Roger E. Grua. The remaining Board member, William 
E. Dunn, was also present, but Mr. Dunn had been recused from any 
participation as a Board member in this proceeding and did not 
participate with respect to the pending motion. 
After the conclusion of oral argument, the Board deliberated 
the matter. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 52-4-1 et seq., 
the Board subsequently entered an order, the terms of which are 
restated as follows: 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondents' motion to close the 
hearing to be conducted before the Board is denied. 
Specifically, Dr. Lunt, Ms, Reinerth, Dr. Blackham, and Dr. 
Tanner vote to conduct a hearing in this proceeding which shall 
be open to the press and public. Dr. Christensen and Dr. Grua 
would close the hearing. 
Dated this _^2_/day of APri1/ i" 2 
FOR THE BOARD 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTHENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE 
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant 
to an August 17, 1989 Notice of Agency Action. The notice, which 
was signed by David E. Robinson as the Director of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, recited a hearing 
would be conducted on October 4, 1989 and indicated the presiding 
Q^ *iro>» ;»•- t^e 9^2r",'r.rr would be J. Steven E^ ilund Administrative 
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. 
On April 30, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 
Oral argument was conducted with respect to that motion on May 
23, 1991. Prior to conclusion of that argument, counsel for 
Respondents made inquiry regarding the procedures which would 
govern any subsequent hearing conducted to address whether a 
disciplinary sanction would enter as to Respondents' licenses. 
The Court informed counsel for Respondents as to the respective 
roles of both the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board and the 
Administrative Law Judge in that process. 
Respondents now seek further clarification, urging the 
presiding officer in this proceeding should be the Administrative 
Law Judge, as initially indicated in the August 17, 1989 notice. 
Respondents assert the Administrative Law Judge should enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and then submit any 
recommendation to the Board for its review. On April 1, 1992, 
oral argument was presented as to the just-referenced matter and 
the Administrative Law Judge entered an order, the terms of which 
are restated as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert this proceeding should be conducted in a 
manner consistent with that set forth in the August 17, 1989 
notice. Specifically, Respondents urge no basis exists to 
designate various presiding officers to act in different 
capacities during the course of this proceeding. The Division 
contends the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the 
UAPA) provides such flexibility and does not require the same 
individual or body of individuals to act as the presiding officer 
for all purposes throughout an adjudicative proceeding. 
The UAPA clearly provides that different individuals or 
entities may act as the presiding officer with regard to a given 
phase of a proceeding. For example, Section 63-46b-3(2)(a) 
provides the notice of agency action shall be signed by "a 
presiding officer11. Mr. Robinson thus acted as the presiding 
officer for that purpose when the August 17, 1989 notice of 
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agency action was issued. Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(x) also 
requires the notice of agency action to identify the "name, 
title, mailing address and telephone number" of the presiding 
officer. The confusion in this case has been prompted by the 
August 17, 1989 notice, which failed to specifically and 
adequately inform Respondents as to the respective role of the 
Board and the Administrative Law Judge in this proceeding. In 
that regard, it is necessary to review the UAPA, the legislative 
history of Section 13-1-12 and Section 58-1-16 and the nature of 
agency practice pursuant to those statutes. 
The UAPA, which became effective January 1, 1988, generally 
applies to all state agencies. Section 63-46b-2(h) defines 
"presiding officer" as: 
. . . an agency head, or an individual or 
body of individuals designated by the agency 
head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to 
conduct an adjudicative proceeding. 
Section 63-46b-2(h) further provides: 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not 
compromised, an agency may substitute one 
presiding officer for another during any 
proceeding; 
(iii) A person who acrs as a presiding 
Gi.iiC6r au. one px^ ase Ci. a proceeding nccu nc*» 
continue as the presiding officer during all 
phases of the proceeding. 
The just-quoted statutes provide some guidance and limitations 
regarding who can serve as presiding officers. See Comments of 
Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the Drafting and 
Interpretation of the UAPA (Code Co. at 11). Section 63-46b-
2(h)(ii) and (iii) jointly operate to provide that different 
individuals or entities may act as the presiding officer with 
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respect to a given phase of a proceeding and, significantly, it 
is not necessary any given presiding officer during an earlier 
stage of a proceeding continue as the presiding officer 
throughout the latter stages of the proceeding. 
Section 13-1-8.5(1) provides the Department of Commerce and 
its various divisions shall comply with the UAPA in their 
adjudicative proceedings. Section 13-1-1 provides the Department 
may employ administrative law judges to conduct hearings before 
the Department. Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12 
stated: 
(1) The administrative law judge or an 
occupational board or representative 
committee, with assistance from the 
administrative law judge, shall render a 
written recommendation of administrative 
action, supported by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law . . . 
Section 13-1-12 now provides: 
(1)(a) At the close of an adjudicative 
proceeding, the administrative law judge or 
an occupational board or representative 
committee with assistance from the 
administrative law judge, shall issue an 
order. 
Section 58-1-1 et seq. both establishs and generally governs 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Section 
58-1-16(1)(a) expressly provides the Division shall comply with 
the UAPA in all disciplinary licensure proceedings. Prior to 
January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 stated as follows: 
(1)(a) Before suspending, revoking, or 
refusing to renew a license, and before 
issuing a cease and desist order, the divison 
shall notify the licensee or license 
applicant of the action by letter deposited 
in the post office with postage prepaid 
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addressed to the last address of the licensee 
or license applicant known to the division, 
that the action is being considered and that 
the division will provide the licensee or 
license applicant with a formal hearing 
before an appropriate hearing officer or 
board, as designated bv the director. 
Section 58-1-16(2) further stated: 
All hearings provided under this section 
shall be held before an appropriate hearing 
officer or board, as designated bv the 
director, pursuant to Chapter 1, Title 13. 
The board or hearing officer shall render a 
written recommendation supported by the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made 
at the hearing together with a recommendation 
for action. The director, with the 
concurrence of the appropriate board, may 
issue a written order based on the 
recommendations but is not bound to follow 
the recommendations of the administrative law 
judge or the hearing officer. The written 
order of the director shall include the 
rationale and justification for the decision. 
If the director does not issue an order 
within 10 days after the administrative law 
judge or the hearing officer has made the 
recommendations, the recommendations shall be 
binding on the parties to the administrative 
action. 
Section 58-1-16 was amended, effective January 1, 1988. That 
statute now provides: 
(a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be 
as designated by the director; 
(b) The presiding officer shall make 
written recommendations for action, findings 
of fact, and conclusions of law; 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of 
the appropriate board, may issue a written 
order based on the recommendations but is not 
bound to follow the recommendations of the 
presiding officer; 
(d) If the director does not issue an 
order within ten days after the presiding 
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officer has made the recommendations, the 
recommendations of the presiding officer 
shall become the order• 
Section 58-7-2(6) specifically governs possible entry of a 
disciplinary sanction with respect to an individual licensed to 
practice dentistry. That statute provides: 
The division, upon recommendation of the 
board, may suspend or revoke the license of a 
dentist or dental hygienist for 
unprofessional conduct and may reinstate such 
license. 
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 provided for a 
hearing before "an appropriate hearing officer or board" and 
recognized that either the board or the hearing officer was 
authorized to render a written recommendation. Subsequent 
amendments to Section 58-1-16 now generally provide that 
adjudicative proceedings amy be held before "an appropriate 
presiding officer". The statute, as amended, reflects no 
legislative intent that the presiding officer could not be either 
an appropriate hearing officer or the board. 
Prior to January l, 1988, Section 13-1-12 authorized either 
an administrative law judge, or an occupational board or 
representative committee with assistance from the administrative 
law judge, to issue findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
recommendation for action. Although that statute was 
subsequently amended, it still authorizes either the 
administrative law judge, or the board or committee with 
assistance from the administrative law judge, to issue a order at 
the close of an adjudicative proceeding (i.e. after the 
conclusion of a hearing). 
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The Court takes notice of the fact that the Division's 
practice has been to to designate an administrative law judge as 
presiding officer for the purposes of ruling on questions of law 
and procedure and to also designate the appropriate board of the 
specific licensed profession to enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a recommendation• Such has consistently 
been the prevailing agency practice, both prior to and after the 
1988 amendments to Section 58-1-16 and Section 13-1-12. It 
appears that practice has been employed to utilize the respective 
expertise of an administrative law judge, consistent with the 
provisions of Section 13-1-11, as well as the recognized 
expertise of the various boards set forth in Title 58. 
To the extent the term "presiding officer" - used in Section 
58-1-16 - is ambiguous, a reasonable administrative 
interpretation and practice should be given some weight. Salt 
Lake City v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 568 P.2d 738 (1977); Cannon 
v. Gardner, Utah, 611 P.2d 1207 (1980). Given the reasonable 
administrative interpretation of - and practice under - the 
statutes in question, the Court concludes the instant 
adjudicative proceeding may properly be conducted in a similar 
manner and the August 17, 1989 notice failed to accurately 
identify that procedure. 
Thus, supplemental notice is now provided that the Board 
will act as the presiding officer in this proceeding to thus 
render a written recommended order, supported by the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Consistent with Section 13-1-
12(1)(a), further notice is now provided the administrative law 
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judge will assist the Board in preparing that order for its 
issuance. Consistent with Section 13-1-11 and the long standing 
practice in professional disciplinary licensure hearings, notice 
is further provided the administrative law judge will rule on 
questions of law and procedure which may arise, both prior to and 
during the hearing. 
One further matter should be addressed. The Court notes 
Respondents previously filed a June 20, 1991 motion to recuse 
David E. Robinson from participating in this proceeding. 
Further, the Division has filed a March 10, 1992 notice, whereby 
Mr. Robinson has recused himself in that regard. Pursuant to 
Section 58-1-16, Mr. Robinson could have been otherwise 
authorized to act as the presiding officer as to any findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order entered by the 
Board. 
This Court's March 19, 1992 Scheduling Order indicated oral 
argument could be presented as to whether any recommended order 
submittted by the Board may properly be subject to review and 
subsequent action by David L. Buhler, Executive Director of the 
Department of Commerce. The UAPA is silent as to both any 
procedure which governs possible recusal of a presiding officer 
and the consequences of any such recusal. However, Section 13-1-
12(2) provides as follows: 
If a division director is unable for any 
reason to fairly review or rule upon an order 
of the administrative law judge or a board or 
committee, the executive director shall 
review and rule upon the order. 
Given the language of the just-quoted statute, it would appear 
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David L. Buhler is thus authorized to rule on any findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order subsequently 
entered by the Board in this proceeding. The Court will contact 
respective counsel on April 13, 1992 to identify whether 
Respondents anticipate filing any motion to recuse Mr. Buhler 
from participation in this proceeding. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Dentists and Dental 
Hygienists Board shall act as the presiding officer in this 
proceeding to render a written recommended order, supported by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Further, the 
administrative law judge will assist the Board in preparing that 
order for its issuance and the administrative law judge shall 
rule on all questions of law and procedure which may arise during 
the pendency of this proceeding. 
It is further ordered that any motion to recuse David L. 
Buhler from participation in this proceeding shall be filed 
within ten (10) days after the Court has conducted a conference 
call with respective counsel to determine whether any such motion 
^ 2 2.,*^^"^/^^*^p^o^ 
Dated this rf&*~
 d a y o f April, 1 9 9 2 
J.WSteven (Eklund 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL 6 PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS : 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER : 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES J 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : 
ORDER ON DIVISION'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
: CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
By motion, dated June 14, 1991, the Division seeks to 
exclude certain evidence in the hearing to be conducted before 
the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board in the above-entitled 
matter. Specifically, the Division urges: (1) evidence 
concerning K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation 
should be excluded; and (2) evidence of that nature as to other 
witnesses similarly situated should also be excluded. 
Respondents filed a response to the just-described motion on 
July 1, 1991 and the Division's reply was filed July 2, 1991. 
Oral argument was conducted April 1, 1992 before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, 
and the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court, now being fully advised in the premises, enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Division contends none of the above-referenced evidence 
is relevant as to whether Respondents engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as alleged in the August 17, 1989 Petition. The 
Division further asserts the evidence should be excluded because 
its probative value - if any - is substantially- outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence would confuse the 
issues and "drag out details of K.W.'s private life for no 
legitimate reason or purpose". 
Respondents note Count I of the petition, which contains an 
allegation they took "sexual liberties" with certain patients. 
Respondents urge that allegation places the sexual activity of 
the supposed victims at issue, the Board must determine whether 
the actions allegedly taken were "liberties" or "invited 
responses" and evidence of the supposed victim's consent is thus 
relevant. 
Respondents also contend K.W.'s past sexual conduct 
demonstrates her propensity to brazenly pursue sexual relations, 
the conduct which allegedly occurred between her and Respondents 
was prompted by her aggressive suggestion and the alleged conduct 
thus reflects an isolated incident not indicative of any public 
threat. Respondents thus assert evidence of K.W.'s consenting 
participation is a relevant mitigating factor to be considered by 
the Board as to any disciplinary sanction which may be warranted 
in this proceeding. 
Section 63-46b-8 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(hereinafter, the UAPA) provides: 
2 
(1) . . . in all formal adjudicative 
proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as 
follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall 
regulate the course of the hearing 
to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to avoid all the 
parties reasonable opportunity to 
present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon 
objection by a party, the presiding 
officer: 
(i) may exclude 
evidence that is 
irrelevant, immaterial, 
or unduly repetitous . . 
Comments of the Utah Administative Law Advisory Committee on the 
drafting and interpretation of the UAPA reflect as follows: 
The intent of the Advisory Committee was 
that the grant of authority to the presiding 
officer found in Section 63-46b-8(1)(a) 
should be broadly construed. (Code Co. 1988 
at 13-14) . 
The above-quoted statute does not expressly make the Utah Rules 
of Evidence applicable in formal adjudicative proceedings. 
However, Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(i) allows a presiding officer to 
exclude irrelevant evidence. Instructively, Rule 401 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as: 
. . . evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
Rule 403 generally provides that relevant evidence "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or 
misleading the jury . • ." 
The evidence which is the subject of this pending motion 
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specifically involves Rule 404, which states: 
(a) Evidence of a person7s character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(3) Evidence of the character of 
a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608 and 609. 
Rule 608 governs evidence offered concerning the character and 
conduct of a witness as follows: 
(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting his credibility, other than 
conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
They may, however, in the discretion of the 
court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning his 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness 
or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. 
During oral argument on the pending motion, Respondents 
asserted K.W.'s credibility (or that of any other witness) may be 
assailed by evidence of the prior sexual history or reputation of 
that witness. Such assertion is without merit for numerous 
reasons. First, Rule 608 expressly precludes extrinsic evidence 
of that nature for such a purpose. Further, prior sexual history 
of a witness is not probative of the veracity of the witness. In 
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
Because the law does not and should not 
recognize any connection between the veracity 
of a witness and her sexual promiscuity, the 
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proposed evidence has no relevancy in regard 
to the truthfulness of her testimony . . .. 
Such evidence, if offered to attack the credibility of a witness, 
should be particularly excluded because "its primary purpose and 
effect" would be to "cast aspersions" on the witness and 
"besmirch her character" in the eyes of the Board. See Bullock 
v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975). 
The remaining issue is whether the evidence in question is 
admissible regarding K.W.'s possible consent (or that of any 
other patient) to the alleged conduct of either of the 
Respondents. In State v. Johns, supra, the Court stated: 
. . . in cases involving forcible rape or 
aggravated sexual assault, the fact a woman 
has consented to sexual activity in the past 
under different circumstances and with 
individuals other than the defendant has 
little if any relevancy to the question of 
her consent and the situation involved here. 
However, . . . there are some cases in 
which the reputation of the prosecutrix and 
in which specific prior sexual activity mav 
become relevant and its probative value 
outweighs the detrimental impact of its 
introduction. Id. at 1263-64. 
The Court thus set forth the following test: 
While the balancing of the probative value 
of the evidence and its detrimental effect is 
entrusted to the discretion of the trial 
judge, in the usual case such evidence, 
either of general reputation or specific 
prior acts, is simply not relevant to anv 
issue in the rape prosecution including the 
consent of the prosecutrix. Such evidence is 
admissible only when the court finds under 
the circumstances of the particular case such 
evidence is relevant to a material factual 
dispute and its probative value outweighs the 
inherent danger of unfair prejudice to the 
prosecutrix, confusion of issues, unwarranted 
invasion of the complaintant's privacy, 
consideration of undue delay and time waste, 
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and the needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. Id at 1264. (Emphasis added.) 
Although this is not a criminal proceeding, the just-stated 
principles are persuasive and should also be applied in this 
case. 
Evidence of consensual participation by a patient with 
respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly undertaken by either 
of the Respondents has significant probative value as to both the 
circumstances which may have prompted whatever occurred between 
Respondents and a given patient and the nature of any 
disciplinary sanction which should enter if unprofessional 
conduct is found to have occurred. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
recognized the vital function of cross-examination in 
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. D.B. v. Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 
(1989). Respondents may thus cross-examine any given patient 
concerning the specific circumstances of this case and the 
possible existence of the above-referenced mitigating factor. 
Further, evidence of a patient's prior consensual sexual 
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the 
context of a physician/patient relationship has some probative 
valuie, insofar as it relates to the issue of consensual 
participation of that patient in this case. Within the just-
stated constraints, Respondents may cross-examine such a witness 
in this proceeding as to that matter. 
However, any evidence of a witness' general prior sexual 
history or reputation should be excluded for various reasons. 
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The right to cross-examine a witness "does not entail the right 
to harrass, annoy or humiliate [a] witness on cross-examination". 
State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), quoting Evans 
v. Alaska. 550 P.2d 830, 837 (Alaska 1976). Character evidence 
of prior sexual behavior is often of "slight probative value, is 
very prejudicial and may confuse the issues at trial". State v. 
Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988). As that Court further 
stated: 
One of the trial judge's duties is to 
regulate the admission of character evidence 
so as to exclude evidence which tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main 
question of what actually happened on a 
particular occasion- This process prevents 
the trier of fact from rewarding one 
individual and punishing another because of 
their respective characters, instead of 
focusing upon the evidence in the case. Id. 
Given the foregoing, the Court necessarily concludes any 
evidence of a witness' prior sexual history or reputation -
beyond the limited scope of cross-examination identified herein -
would unduly subject either K.W. or another witness similarly 
situated to humiliation and constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
their privacy. The degree of unfair prejudice which would result 
is thus clear. 
Importantly, such evidence would also tend to confuse the 
issues and mislead the Board by shifting what should be the 
predominant focus of this proceeding (i.e., the nature of 
whatever conduct occurred between Respondents and K.W. or other 
patients) to the myriad relationships which existed or conduct 
which occurred regarding any given patient and a third party. 
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Further, if any extrinsic evidence of that nature were allowed, 
it would also require the Board to assess the credibility of the 
various witnesses who testify regarding those relationships. 
Such would be particularly indirect and potentially fruitless 
process with respect to the Board's primary charge, which is to 
determine the nature of Respondents7 conduct with respect to K.W. 
or other patients. 
Respondents urge the Board is more capable than a common 
jury of assessing the evidence sought to be admitted and such 
evidence should thus be allowed, even though of minimal probative 
value, because a lesser risk of undue prejudice exists in this 
administrative setting. The Court is not persuaded Rule 4 03 is 
any less applicable in this adjudicative proceeding than it would 
be in a criminal or civil action. Simply put, the initial and 
continuing focus of this proceeding should be directed toward 
whatever conduct was undertaken by either Respondent with respect 
to those individuals referenced in the petition, the 
circumstances which prompted whatever may have occurred, whether 
any basis exists to impose a disciplinary sanction as to either 
Respondent and the nature of any sanction which is warranted. 
Given the disposition of the pending motion, Respondents 
will thus be allowed to present and support their theory of the 
case, subject to restrictions which are necessary to ensure the 
evidence received in this proceeding is admitted within the 
proper scope of those issues to be addressed by the Board. 
ORDER 
Evidence of consensual participation by K.W. or another 
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patient with respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly 
undertaken by either of the Respondents is admissible in this 
proceeding. Respondents may thus cross-examine those witnesses 
concerning those circumstances in an attempt to establish the 
existence of such a mitigating factor. 
Further, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' prior sexual 
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the 
context of a physician/patient relationship shall be also 
admissible, both on cross-examination of that witness and for 
possible impeachment purposes on rebuttal. 
However, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' general 
prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded for the 
reasons set forth herein. 
Dated this day of April, 1992 
ajdti Steven /Eklund l i n i s t r a t i ve Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF TEE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF ! 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS : 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER : 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON APPLICABLE 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
: CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant 
to an August 17, 1989 notice of agency action. Sparing detail, 
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, 1991 and oral 
argument was conducted on May 23, 1991. Prior to the conclusion 
of oral argument, counsel for Respondents made inquiry regarding 
the standard of proof which would govern any subsequent hearing 
conducted to address whether a disciplinary sanction should enter 
as to Respondents' licenses. 
The Court thus requested both parties to submit memoranda as 
to that matter. The Division filed its brief on June 11, 1991, 
Respondents filed their memorandum on June 21, 1991 and the 
Division's final reply was filed July 1, 1991. Oral argument was 
subsequently conducted April 1, 1992 and the Court took the 
matter under advisement. 
The Administrative Law Judge, now being fully advised in the 
premises, enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend the applicable standard of proof in 
this proceeding should be clear and convincing evidence• 
Specifically, Respondents urge this proceeding -is quasi-criminal 
in nature and that the Division seeks to impose a punitive 
sanction which would impinge on their constitutionally protected 
rights. Respondents also assert Utah courts have required clear 
and convincing proof in a civil contempt case and such a case is 
"strikingly similar" to this professional licensure disciplinary 
proceeding. Given both the nature of this proceeding and 
Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their ability to 
practice their chosen profession, they contend the Division 
should be required to prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The Division asserts Utah courts adhere to the general rule 
that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a 
preponderance of the evidence. The Division notes there is no 
statutorily established standard of proof which governs the 
instant proceeding and many other courts in other states have 
utilized the preponderance standard in professional licensure 
disciplinary proceedings. 
In Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals described a professional 
licensure disciplinary proceeding as: 
2 
. . . a special, somewhat unique, statutory 
proceeding, in which the disciplinary board 
investigates the conduct of a member of the 
profession to determine if disciplinary 
action is appropriate to maintain sound 
professional standards of conduct and protect 
the public. Id. at 105-06. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also recognized that a person 
lfwhose freedom to pursue his profession is seriously restricted 
by an official action . . . may compel the government to afford 
him a hearing complying with the traditional requirements of due 
process" • D.B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Endler 
v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal.2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 304 (1968). 
No statute exists which establishes the standard of proof 
applicable in this proceeding. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Sections 63-46b-l et seq., hereinafter, the 
UAPA), those statutes governing the Department of Commerce 
(Sections 13-1-1 et seq.) and the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing (Sections 58-1-1 et seq.) are all silent 
in that regard, although Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the UAPA 
provides the standard on judicial review as "substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court". 
Further, Utah courts have not specifically addressed the 
appropriate standard of proof in professional licensure 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division. Thus, the 
issue presented should be resolved based on a review of analogous 
cases decided by the courts of this state and the more persuasive 
decisions rendered by courts in other states. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that driver license 
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revocation proceedings are not necessarily "criminal" or "quasi-
criminal" in nature, Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 
595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). In Ward v. Smith. 573 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1978), the Court held a parole revocation hearing was an 
administrative, rather than a criminal, proceeding. Id. at 782. 
See also Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah -1986) ; Walker v. 
Board of Pardons, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
In further contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, 
the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that a driver license 
revocation proceeding "requires proof only by a preponderance of 
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt". Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1982). The preponderance 
standard also applies in a parole revocation proceeding. Johns 
v, Shulsen, supra, at 13 38; Walker v. Board of Pardons, supra. 
Respondents contend their respective interests in the 
continuation of their livelihood are deserving of more protection 
than that afforded a motorist merely faced with the loss of 
driving privileges or a parolee who might lose their conditional 
freedom. Even assuming Respondents are correct, many courts in 
sister states have applied the preponderance standard of proof in 
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. Rucker v. 
Michigan Board of Medicine, 138 Mich. App. 209, 360 N.W.2d 154, 
155 (1984); In re Schultz. 375 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. App. 
1985); Forster v. Board, 103 N.W. 776, 714 P.2d 580, 582 (1986); 
Eaves v. Board of Medical Examiners, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 
1991). 
Other courts have utilized a clear and convincing evidence 
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test. Ettinaer v. Board of hedical Quality Assurance. 185 
Cal.Rptr. 601, 603 (1982); In re Zar, 434 N.W.2d 598r 602 (S.D. 
1989). In Hoaan v. Mississippi Board of Nursing. 457 So.2d 931 
(Miss. 1984), the Court characterized a license revocation 
proceeding as "penal" in nature and thus required proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. Id. at 934. The South-Dakota Supreme 
Court has emphasized a higher standard of proof should apply in 
such a proceeding due to the interest involved (i.e., a 
professional's career), stating: 
The revocation of a license of a 
professional [person] carries with it dire 
consequences. It not only involves 
necessarily disgrace and humiliation, but it 
means the end of [his or her] professional 
career. 
In re Zar, supra. 
However, a professional licensure disciplinary hearing is 
not a criminal proceeding in nature. See Rogers v. Division of 
Real Estate, supra, and cases cited herein. Concededly, 
Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their 
professional livelihood and the possible deprivation of that 
ability as a result of this proceeding are substantial. In re 
Polk. 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (1982). Nevertheless, this 
Court seriously questions Respondents' implicit suggestion that a 
license to practice dentistry represents a fundamental 
constitutional right. The New Jersey Court squarely rejected a 
similar contention in the case of In re Polk, supra, 
instructively stating as follows: 
A license to practice a profession is not a 
basic individual right. While it embraces a 
5 
substantial individual interest which 
deserves abundant protection, it cannot be 
equated with a fundamental right, the 
reasonable regulation of which can be 
measured and justified only by a compelling 
state interest. The right to practice 
medicine itself is granted in the interest of 
the public and is "always subject to 
reasonable regulation in the public 
interest." Id. at 17 (Citation omitted). 
In its persuasive and well reasoned decision, the Court further 
recognized the government's "paramount obligation to protect the 
general health of the public" and the right of physicians to 
practice their profession as being "necessarily subordinate to 
this governmental interest". Id at 14. Significantly, the Court 
concluded: 
We are satisfied that the preponderance of 
the evidence burden of proof is sufficient 
for purposes of an administrative 
adjudication concerning professional guilt 
and discipline against a licensed medical 
doctor. In view of the subject matter of 
such proceedings, the nature of the evidence, 
the qualifications of witnesses, the special 
expertise of the tribunal, the relative 
advantages and resources of the parties, and 
the minimal risk of inaccurate or erroneous 
factfinding and final decisionmaking, 
confidence in a final adjudication would not 
be imperiled by employing the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. These proceedings 
do not demand an enhanced burden of proof. 
Id. at 16. (All emphasis herein added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently addressed the standard 
of proof applicable in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In 
the early case of In re Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778 (1916), 
the Court commented that evidence in such a proceeding "should be 
clear and convincing" and such a rule "is based upon a most solid 
foundation". Id at 779. The Court later recognized the 
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applicable test as being a "clear preponderance of the evidence". 
In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 305 (1933). 
In a subsequent case, the Court stated that charges in an 
attorney disciplinary proceeding "should be clearly sustained by 
convincing proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence". In 
re McCullouah. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939). -More recently, 
the Court has stated as follows: 
-We agree that because of the seriousness of 
the consequences to the attorney involved 
touching upon the important right to follow 
his vocation and make a livelihood, that such 
is the established rule (i.e., the persuasion 
of his misconduct must be by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
In re MacFarlane. 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (1960). The 
somewhat misleading phrase "clear preponderance", as used by the 
Court in the case of In re Barclay, supra, has been defined by 
the Washington Supreme Court as follows: 
"Clear preponderance" is an intermediate 
standard of proof in these cases, requiring 
greater certainty than "simple preponderance" 
but not to the extent required under "beyond 
reasonable doubt". This intermediate 
standard reflects the unique character of 
disciplinary proceedings. The standard of 
proof is higher than the simple preponderance 
normally required in civil actions because 
the stigma associated with disciplinary 
action is generally greater than that 
associated with most tort and contract cases. 
Yet because the interests in protecting the 
public, maintaining confidence, and 
preserving the integrity of the legal 
profession also weigh heavily in these 
proceedings, the standard of proof is 
somewhat lower than the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard required in criminal 
prosecutions. 
In re Allotta. 109 Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628, 630-31 (1988). 
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Respondents thus suggest the enhanced standard of proof in 
attorney disciplinary proceedings should also be applicable in 
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the 
Division. Since the underlying purpose of disciplining both 
attorneys and physicians is protection of the public, one court 
has recognized the same enhanced standard should apply to a 
practitioner of either profession. Ettinaer v. Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance, supra. 
However, the New Jersey Surpeme Court has acknowledged a 
f,less stringent burden of proof" can be rationally applied in 
medical licensure proceedings "as more protective of society's 
important interest in individual life and health". In re Polk, 
supra, at 18. Further, the Iowa Supreme Court has upheld 
dissimilar standards of proof as between those professions "where 
the regulations being compared have been established by differing 
branches of government". Eaves v. Board of Medical Quality 
Examiners. supra. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the same issue and 
applied the preponderance standard of proof in a dental licensure 
disciplinary proceeding, stating: 
We note the burden of proof in attorney 
disciplinary cases is clear and convincing 
evidence. Attorney disciplinary proceedings, 
under the supervision and control of the 
judiciary, are sui generis. Attorney 
misconduct, striking as it does, at the 
administration of our justice system, gives 
society a heightened interest in the outcome 
of attorney discipline. A higher standard of 
proof is indicated. (All citations omitted). 
In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1989). The Court nevertheless 
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recognized the nature of the proceeding and appropriately 
provided the following caution: 
. . . these proceedings brought on behalf 
of the state, attacking a person's 
professional and personal reputation and 
character and seeking to impose disciplinary 
sanctions, are no ordinary proceedings. We 
trust that in all professional disciplinary 
matters, the finder of fact, bearing in mind 
the gravity of the decision to be made, will 
be persuaded only by evidence with heft. The 
reputation of a profession and the reputation 
of a professional as well as the public trust 
are at stake. Id. 
Respondents cite other cases decided by the courts of this 
state where a clear and convincing standard of proof was applied. 
Wvcoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 
283 (1962); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
However, neither of those cases involved a disciplinary sanction 
with respect to a professional license. Since those cases are 
distinctly different in nature from this proceeding, the 
principles set forth therein provide no meaningful guidance for 
purposes of the matter now under review. Further, this tribunal 
has previously concluded the standard of proof which should apply 
in professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by 
the Division is a preponderance of the evidence. In re Barney 
(Case No. OPL-91-69, filed August 2, 1991). 
Based on the foregoing, a considered review of existing case 
law and the arguments presented by both parties, this Court is 
not persuaded the standard of proof previously applied in 
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the 
Division should be abandoned. The Court further concludes the 
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clear and convincing standard of proof applied in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings in this state should not be extended as 
to govern this proceeding, 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the standard of proof in this 
professional licensure disciplinary proceeding shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Dated this _ j ^ ^ T day of April, 1992 
J .W Steven"] Eklund ^ 
Administrative Law Judge 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN and BRENT D. 
HANSEN, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. OPL-89-47 
Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen, hereby petition the Utah Court of Appeals 
to permit an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Honorable J. Steven Ecklund entered 
in this matter on the following dates: 
1. Order on Procedures Governing Disposition of Respondents' Motion To Close 
Hearing, dated April 7, 1992. 
2. Order on Respondents' Motion to Close Hearing, dated April 7, 1992. 
3. Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order, dated April 7, 1992. 
4. Order on Division's Motion in Limine, dated April 17, 1992. 
5. Order on Applicable Standard of Proof, dated April 17, 1992. 
A copy of the orders sought to be reviewed are attached, as is a brief memorandum 
explaining the jurisdictional basis for this petition for review. 
PERSONS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED 
Petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen are the only persons substantially 
affected by these orders of the Division, although such orders, to the extent that they represent 
ongoing and established procedures of the Division, may affect all persons against whom actions 
are brought by the Division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah filed a Notice of Agency Action against 
petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen. The Notice of Agency Action sought to 
suspend or revoke petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional conduct under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-2(6). Among other things, the Notice alleged that petitioners had 
violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-1.l(7)(k), (1), (q) and (r) by, among other 
things, the taking of lewd nude photographs of K.W., a patient, and performing unnecessary 
treatments in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors. The Notice also indicated that 
the presiding officer would be J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department 
of Commerce. 
On April 30, 1991 respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. On May 23, 
1991, the Division heard oral arguments on this motion. As a result, it made a preliminary 
order as to the identity of the presiding officer. On April 1, 1992, in oral argument, 
respondents requested a clarification of the identity of the presiding officer. On April 7, 1992, 
Judge Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order which stated that the 
Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would act as the presiding officer in the hearing to 
determine factual issues and rendering a written recommended order, and that the administrative 
law judge would act as the presiding officer regarding legal issues and would assist the Board 
in preparing that order. 
On June 20, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to close the hearing on the matter to all 
members of the press and public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memoran-
dum. The Salt Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion. On July 2, 1991, 
the Division granted the Tribune's motion to intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed 
its memorandum in opposition to petitioners' motion. On July 9 and 10, 1991, petitioners 
filed replies to the submissions of the Division and the Tribune. Oral argument on this motion 
was heard on April 1, 1992 by Judge Ecklund. On April 7, 1991, he ordered that petitioners' 
motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board and that the hearing was governed 
by the Open and Public Meetings Act because the Board, rather than the Administrative Law 
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Judge was the presiding officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
recommended order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied petitioners' 
motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public. 
On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to exclude certain evidence, 
including: (1) K.W/s prior sexual history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that 
nature as to similarly situated witnesses. Petitioners filed a response to this motion on July 
1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed a reply memorandum. Judge Ecklund heard 
oral argument on this motion on April 1, 1992. He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and other 
witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded from the proceeding on 
April 17, 1992. 
On June 11, 1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of the standard of proof which 
should govern a hearing on the merits of the action. Petitioners filed a response on June 21, 
1991, to which the Division replied on July 1, 1991. Judge Ecklund also heard this motion on 
April 1, 1992. Following the oral argument, on April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard 
of proof for professional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Petitioners bring this Petition to appeal from all of these orders. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
1. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the Board would act as 
presiding officer for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law and, at the 
same time in the same proceeding, that the Administrative Law Judge would be the presiding 
officer for purposes of ruling on questions of law and procedure? 
2. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in denying petitioners' motion to close 
the hearing and in ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public? 
3. Did the Administrative Law Judge en in ordering that petitioners' motion to 
close the proceedings to the public and press was governed by the Open and Public Meetings 
Act because the finder of fact in the present action was the Board rather than the Administrative 
Law Judge? 
4. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the evidence of K.W.'s 
and other witnesses' general prior sexual history be excluded from the proceeding? 
5. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in determining that the standard of proof 
for professional licensing proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence? 
Petitioners seek, for relief, the resolution of these issues. 
ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE AGENCY 
The factual recitation above indicates that each of these issues was briefed and argued 
before the Division of Professional Licensing, and that the Administrative Law Judge considered 
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each of these issues and issued separate orders on them. Copies of each of these orders are 
attached to this Petition. 
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY 
Immediate appeal from these orders is necessary because petitioners will be irreparably 
harmed if they are forced to continue litigating this matter under these orders in order to obtain 
a final judgment. The major harm which will, in all probability, ensue should this petition be 
denied and petitioners be forced to continue litigation under the present orders is the complete, 
total and irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations resulting from an 
open and public hearing on the merits of the case. Because of the extremely controversial and 
inflammatory nature of the charges made by the Division against petitioners and the highly 
prejudicial nature of the evidence which might be introduced, petitioners, even if they were 
ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would likely lose their dental practices and personal 
reputations as a consequence of extensive publicity in this matter. That any hearing on the 
merits will be highly publicized by the press and other media is extremely likely. The Salt 
Lake Tribune has already intervened in opposition to petitioners' motion to close the 
proceedings. K.W., one of the more controversial witnesses for the Division, has already 
appeared on local and national television and made statements about the case, which has already 
had serious repercussions for petitionen. Should this matter become a "media event," the 
ensuing trouble and loss of reputation for petitioners will be uncontainable and incalculable. 
For this reason, an interlocutory appeal on this order is critical to the administration of justice. 
Petitioners should not be tried and convicted in the media, as they will almost assuredly be, but 
the issue should be adjudicated within the non-public confines of the appropriate, legislatively 
established tribunal. 
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similarly, needs immediate attention; 
the Division is only able to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to the 
present proceeding because of its order making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law 
Judge, the trier of fact. The order identifying the presiding officer responsible for factual 
findings as the Board is, therefore, the "cause" of the closure problem. If the Administrative 
Law Judge were the trier of fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then 
the issue of closure of the hearing would possibly not exist. Further, there is substantial chance 
that this order, which allows the Division to "switch" presiding officers at will during the 
course of this single matter, in contravention of the intent of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act and other related statutes, will result in substantial arbitrariness and prejudice to petitioners. 
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as a result of the remaining 
two orders, which prejudice could be avoided should this Court grant their Petition for Review. 
Central to petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for sexual immorality in 
general, and her previous, extensive, and ongoing pattern of behavior in seducing other medical 
practitionen by means of offering sexual favors in return for controlled substances. As a 
consequence of the Administrative Law Judge's Order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior 
sexual history, petitioners' defense will be substantially impaired. This problem should be 
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remedied immediately, not after rendition of a final order, because petitioners will not be able, 
under the present order, to even proffer, let alone prove substantial evidence necessary for their 
defense, making an incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LTITGATTON 
Resolution of all four of these issues on an interlocutory appeal will materially advance 
the termination of the litigation because all four of them, if not resolved now, will need to be 
resolved on an appeal if a final order adverse to petitioners is issued. The likelihood of such 
an adverse result is greatly increased by the exclusion of evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual 
history, which will deprive petitioners of a substantial and important defense, and the order 
determining that the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence rather 
than clear and convincing evidence. Should an adverse final order issue, petitioners would 
appeal these very issues and this Court would consider the appeal. Should this Court find an 
abuse of discretion on even one of these orders, the matter would have to be heard again at a 
substantial waste of time and expense to all parties concerned, with the additional danger that 
memories would have faded and evidence lost. In the context of the present litigation, it would 
be in the clear interest of efficiency as well as fairness to grant petitioners' Petition for Review 
of these interlocutory orders. 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
The present Petition for Review arises from four non-final administrative orders. This 
petition is, accordingly, brought under two alternative theories of jurisdiction: (1) an 
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interlocutory appeal under rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991), and (2) an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Interlocutory Appeal 
Under the new Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and the applicable rules 
promulgated by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, "[a] party aggreived 
may obtain judicial review of final agency action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l). 
Although the UAPA provides substantial rules for review of final administrative orders, see 
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1991), 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1991), and 63-46b-14 
(1991), there appears to be absolutely no provision for an interlocutory appeal from an 
administrative order, except under following language from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) 
(1991): 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting 
all administrative remedies available, except that: 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the 
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
Under this language, a party need not exhaust any or all administrative remedies, including 
obtaining a final order, in order to seek judicial review of the proceeding if the administrative 
remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit received from exhaustion. 
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Administrative remedies are inadequate in the present case because irreparable harm 
will be done to the professional and personal reputations of petitioners, regardless of the 
outcome of this proceeding, should the hearings be open to the press and public. Petitioners 
will also be damaged by the three other orders, as discussed above, unless afforded immediate 
relief. There is no provision in the UAPA or elsewhere that serves to remedy any of these 
problems. Consequently, the available administrative remedies are inadequate. The damage 
that would be done to the individual petitioners' reputations and ability to defend themselves 
from the Division's charges should they not be afforded immediate relief would be devastating 
to them, effectively putting them out of business regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 
matter. This is, surely, "irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from 
requiring exhaustion." 
Accordingly, this Petition for Review is brought under the applicable provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, including rule 14, which allows for judicial review by the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals "of an order or decision of an administrative agency, 
board, commission, committee, or officer." This language does not require that an order 
appealed from be a final order, because section 63-46b-14(2)(b) allows an interlocutory appeal 
under the present circumstances, this Petition should be granted. 
Further, this Petition is brought within 30 days of the date of the first order appealed 
from, and supplies the information required in Rule 14. Because this petition is in the nature 
of an interlocutory appeal, petitioners, in an effort to assist the Court, have followed the 
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format of a rule 5 petition even though rule 5 is inapplicable to administrative orders under 
rule 18. 
Extraordinary writ. 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for relief to be granted under 
its provisions "where no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists/ If this Court 
should determine that a Petition for Review under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, this 
Court should grant review of the orders at issue under rule 65B. 
Under this rule, which was enacted in its present form in 1991, relief is available for 
several categories of injury, including the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public 
authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (1992). Under subsection (e), "[appropriate relief may be 
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion . . . ." 
Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed recently, the substantive 
intent behind the rule, and the requirements for its application, have not changed over the last 
several decades. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have given instruc-
tion as to how this rule governing extraordinary writs is to be applied. Most instructive are 
the guidelines set forth in Anderson v. Baker. 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956): 
(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction or is proceeding in 
excess of its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy, the writ should 
issue as a matter of right. 
(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it 
appears that there is an adequate remedy, the writ should generally not issue, 
but the court is not entirely without discretion. 
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it appears that by an 
erroneous order it has placed one party in a position where he will be 
irreparably injured and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury 
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise of its sound discretion 
use the writ as a procedure for intermediate review. 
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and there is an 
adequate remedy, the writ should never issue. 
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes. Rules (2) and (3) are guides. 
Id. at 285-86, (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for 
Citv of Qgden. 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256, 261)). 
In the present case, petitioners are appealing from orders of an administrative agency 
which are, in their view, abuses of the agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within 
subsection (e) of the rule. This situation also falls within section (3) of the Anderson 
guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the matter but the erroneous orders of the 
Division are placing petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured absent 
immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy of any sort available for 
petitioners. Consequently, this Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, use an 
extraordinary writ as a procedure for the intermediate review of the present orders. 
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law cannot avail himself of 
a rule 65B petition. For example, the plaintiff, in Crist v. Mapleton Citv. 28 Utah 207, 497 
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P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972), did not avail himself of readily available remedies at law, so 
"placed himself out of the reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus." Likewise, the 
Anderson court ruled that "[a]n extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and 
cannot be used as such/ Anderson. 296 P.2d at 285. Should this tribunal determine that an 
appeal under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, there is no other available remedy and 
petitioners should be entitled to review of the orders under rule 65B. 
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B 
petition is available. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield 
Citv. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action for extraordinary relief was the 
appropriate vehicle for obtaining review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial 
of a conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no statutory provision for 
review of a city council action. I$i. at 707. Petitioners, should this Court determine that a rule 
14 petition is unavailable, will be similarly situated with Davis County; a rule 65B writ should, 
therefore, be available to petitioners. 
In the present case, it is impractical and inappropriate to file this petition for a writ in 
the Division because there is no procedural provision for filing such a writ before the Division 
and a request to to the Division to reverse the order will likely be an exercise in futility. 
MEMORANDUM ON THE MERITS 
A petition for review brought under rule 14 does not require a memorandum on the 
merits of the case to be filed at the time the Petition is filed; briefing occurs pursuant to rules 
18, 24, and other applicable rules of the Utah appellate courts subsequent to the filing of the 
Petition. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
the Petition. Petitioner has not filed such a memorandum concurrently with this Petition for 
two reasons: First, petitioner has brought this Petition, in the first alternative, as a rule 14 
Petition; should this Court determine that rule 14 relief is unavailable to petitioners then 
petitioners will promptly submit a rule 19 memorandum. Second, to adequately brief the merits 
of the issues, petitioners must have access to the transcript of the relevant proceedings before 
the Division. No transcript has yet been prepared, but, under the procedures outlined in rules 
15 and 16 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would become available. Should this 
Court grant review on either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of this Court in obtaining 
the record of the proceedings from the Division, including the relevant transcripts. Petitioners 
also seek leave of the court in either granting them the opportunity to fully brief the merits of 
the issues pursuant to rules 18, 24, and all other applicable rules or, in the alternative, granting 
them an extension of time in which to file a rule 19 memorandum of points and authorities on 
the merits of the issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition for Review under the 
provisions of rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
12(2)(b). Should this Court determine that a Petition for Review is not available to petitioners 
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under these rules, petitionen request that this Coun grant review through rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Should this Court grant review under either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of 
the Court in obtaining the record of the proceedings, including the relevant transcripts, from 
the Division, and permission to brief the merits of the issues in full upon receipt of the 
transcripts. 
DATED this " 7 ^ day of May, 1992. 
JACKSON HOWARD, / 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and 
LINDA J. BARCLAY, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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APPENDIX D 
Art. 1, § 11 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injur}- done to him in his 
person property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which 
sha be administered without denial or unnecessary delav; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before an / tribunal in this 
Mate, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
13-1-12. Order by hearing officer or body — Appeal of or-
der to the division director or the executive direc-
tor. 
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law 
judge or an occupational board or representative committee with assis-
tance from the administrative law judge, shall issue an order. 
(b^  The order may be appealed to the executive director or the division 
director for review. 
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to fairly review or rule 
upon an order of the administrative law judge or a board or committee, the 
executive director shall review and rule upon the order. 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1» A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b> the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a> A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13«3nbi. 
(b> The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2> (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4» The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(hi) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary 
remedies pending final disposition. 
(1) Unless precluded b> another statute, the agenc} ma\ grant a sta} of its 
order or other temporan remed} during the pendenc} of judicial review, ac-
cording to the agenc\'s rules 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporar} remedies 
unless extraordmarv circumstances require immediate judicial intervention 
(3) If the agenc}* denies a sta} or denies other temporary remedies re-
quested b\ a part\, the agencVs order of denial shall be mailed to all parties 
and shallspecifv the reasons wh} the sta} or other temporary remed} was not 
granted . 
(4) If the agenc} has denied a stay or other temporar} remed} to protect the 
public health safet}, or welfare against a substantial threat the court ma} 
not grant a sta} or other temporar} remed} unless it finds that 
(a) the agenc} violated its own rules m den}ing the sta} or 
(bi <i) the part} seeking judicial review is hkeh to prevail on the 
merits when the court finalh disposes of the matter, 
<\V the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury 
without immediate relief 
(in) granting relief to the part} seeking review will not substan-
t i a l harm other parties to the proceedings, and 
m i the threat to the public health safet} or welfare relied upon 
b} the agenc\ is not sufficient^ serious to justif} the agenc} s action 
under the circumstances 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1' The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinan writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessar} 
(a) to cam into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2> The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutor} appeals over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court, 
(e) interlocutor} appeals from an} court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felon}, 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felon}, 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordmar} writs sought b} 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felon}, 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to, divorce, annulment propert} division, child 
custod} support, visitation, adoption, and paternit}, 
(D appeals from the Utah Mihtan Court, and 
(ji cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court 
(3' The Court of Appeals upon its own motion onh and b\ the vote of four 
judges of the court ma} certifv to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination an} matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agenc} adjudicative proceedings 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
J u P e t i t * o n f o r Permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
f J Z ^ ^ . fUght b y a ,ny p a r t y b y f l l inB a P e t i t 3 0 n f o r permission to appeal 
S ™ 1+I? t e r locu to ry order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
t^on over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
<b) tees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the bupreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Uerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the 
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the 
appe ate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order bv mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copv of the o'rder, together 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied. 
the filing fee shall be refunded. 
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain: 
(1> A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
(2> A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon; 
(3> A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutor}' appeal 
should be permitted; and 
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and opinion. 
(d> Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party 
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies 
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e^  Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness 
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court 
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent 
to the granting of the petition shall be as. and within the time required, for 
appeals from final judgments. 
TITLE III. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a» Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial re\ iew by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided b\ statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board commis-
sion committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed b\ statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order 
The term ' petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin set aside suspend, 
modif>. or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari The 
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
m the petition If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and ma> thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pa> to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondents), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
is a part\, m the manner prescribed b> Rule 3'e) The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served 
(d^  Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene The motion shall contain a concise 
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed 
Rule 17. Stay pending review. 
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an agency pending direct 
review m the appellate court shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to 
the agenc\ if the agenc> is authorized b\ law to grant a stay If a motion for 
such relief is made to the appellate court, the motion shall show that applica-
tion to the agenc\ for the relief sought is not practicable, or that application 
has been made to the agenc) and denied, with the reasons given by it for 
denial The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the 
facts relied upon and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion shall be 
supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof With the 
motion shall be filed those parts of the record relevant to the relief sought 
Rpacnnahle notice of the filing of the motion and am hearing shall be given to 
all parties to the proceeding in the appellate court The appellate court mav 
condition relief under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other appJopmte 
security The motion shall be filed with the clerk and normally w i l l b e S 
ered b> the court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure would be 
impracticable due to the requirements of time, the application may be consid 
ered by a single justice or judge of the court 
Rule 19. Extraordinary writs. 
(a) Petition for extraordinary writ to a judge or agency; petition; ser-
vice and filing. An application for a writ of quo warranto, mandamus, prohi-
bition, certiorari, or other extraordinary writ referred to in Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, except a writ of habeas corpus, directed to a judge, 
agency, person or entity shall be made by filing a petition with the clerk of the 
appellate court or, in an emergency, with a justice or judge of the appellate 
court. Service of the petition shall be made on the respondent judge, agency, 
person, or entity and on all parties to the action or case in the trial court or 
agency. In the event of an original petition in the appellate court where no 
action is pending in the trial court or agency, the petition shall be served 
personally on the respondent judge, agency, person or entity and service shall 
be made by the most direct means available on all persons or associations 
whose interests might be substantially affected. 
(b> Contents of petition and docket fee. A petition for an extraordinary 
writ shall contain the following: 
( D A statement of all persons or associations, by name or by class, 
whose interests might be substantially affected; 
(2) A statement of the issues presented and of the relief sought: 
(3) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues 
presented by the petition; 
(4) A statement of the reasons why no other plain, speedy, or adequate 
remedy exists and why the writ should issue; 
(5) Except in cases where the writ is directed to a district court, a 
statement explaining why it is impractical or inappropriate to file the 
petition for a writ in the district court; 
(6) Copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record which may be 
essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition: and 
(7) A memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition. 
Upon receipt of the prescribed docket fee, unless waived by the court, the 
clerk shall docket the petition. 
(c) Response to petition and oral argument. Within seven days after 
service of the petition, or such shorter time as may be fixed by the appellate 
court, any respondent or any other party may file a response in opposition or 
concurrence, together with a supporting memorandum of law. The judge. 
agency, person, or entity and all parties in the action other than the petitioner 
shall be deemed respondents for all purposes. Two or more respondents may 
respond jointly. If any respondent does not desire to appear in the proceedings. 
that respondent may advise the clerk of the appellate court and all parties by 
letter, but the petition shall not thereby be taken as admitted. Unless the 
appellate court determines that the petition is frivolous on its face, the clerk 
shall advise the parties of the date of oral argument. 
(d) Denial or grant of petition. The court shall deny or grant the petition, 
and the clerk shall immediately notify the petitioner and all respondents of 
the court's determination. In an emergency, a single justice or judge may 
grant a writ subject to review by the court at the earliest possible time. 
(e) Effect of granting petition for writ of quo warranto or certiorari. 
If the appellate court grants a petition for a writ of quo warranto or certiorari, 
it shall order the record to be transmitted by the respondent to whom the writ 
is directed. The briefing and oral argument shall proceed on a expedited basis. 
and the clerk shall advise all parties of the dates on which briefs are to be filed 
and of the date of oral argument. Briefs submitted pursuant to this subsection 
shall address the merits and shall comply with the requirements of Rules 24 
and 27. The appellate court shall issue its opinion as in other cases. 
(f) Number of copies. An original and seven copies of the petition and any 
response shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies of 
the petition and any response shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. 
(g) Issuance of extraordinary writ by appellate court sua sponte. The 
appellate court, in aid of its own jurisdiction in extraordinary cases, may issue 
a writ of certiorari sua sponte directed to a judge, agency, person, or entity. A 
copy of the writ shall be served on the named respondents in the manner and 
by an individual authorized to accomplish personal service under Rule 4. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, copies of the writ shall be trans-
mitted by the clerk of the appellate court, by the most direct means available. 
to all persons or associations whose interests might be substantially affected 
by the writ. The respondents and the persons or associations whose interests 
are substantially affected may, within four days of the issuance of the writ. 
petition the court to dissolve or amend the writ. The petition shall be accom-
panied by a concise statement of the reasons for dissolution or amendment of 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speed) and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph <b> (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d» (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ 
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed b\ 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or count) jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph This paragraph (b> shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole This paragraph b shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement 
(2> Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced b> filing a 
petition, together with a cop\ thereof with the clerk of the court in uhich 
the commitment leading to confinement v>as issued except that the court 
may order a change of \enue on motion of a part\ for the comenience of 
the parties or witnesses 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment ma\ not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown The peti-
tion shall state 
(i) the place where the petitioner is restrained. 
(n» the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in *hich the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner, 
(mi in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of uhich 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment, 
(iv) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review, 
(v) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state wh\ they are not attached 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the presiding judge of the court in 
which it is filed. The presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceed-
ing to the judge who issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8/ Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(91 Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail' after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be per-
mitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12> Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13 > Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c> Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1' Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b> of this rule. 
this paragraph to shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has 
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
<2» Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
(3» Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
restraint, if known by the petitioner It shall state whether the legaht} of 
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so. 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the restraint 
(4) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion The order shall be sent by 
mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the 
entry of the order of dismissal 
(5 i Issuance and contents of the hearing order. If the petition is 
not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the court shall issue a hearing 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court at a specified 
time for a hearing on the legality of the restraint The court shall direct 
the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and the hearing order by mail 
upon the respondent In the hearing order, the court may direct the re-
spondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained The court 
may direct the respondent to file an answer to the petition within a period 
of time specified in the hearing order If the petitioner waives the right to 
be present at the hearing the hearing order shall be modified accord-
ingly 
(6) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re-
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate 
(7) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody m the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent in the action 
(8) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law 
(9) Hearing and subsequent proceedings. At the time specified in 
the hearing order for the hearing the court shall hear the matter in a 
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly The respondent 
or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be 
restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so If the hearing 
order requires an answer to the petition, the respondent shall file an 
answer within the time prescribed m the hearing order The answer shall 
state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to 
have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been trans-
ferred to any other person, and if so the identity of the transferee, the date 
of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer The hearing 
order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription 
in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and 
intent of the proceeding to the respondent 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, 
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (di. Any person who 
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph 
(2* of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph id' if 
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by an-
other or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B» where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E» where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2> Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
